LORRAINE OVERVIEW
On 6 June 1944, Allied troops landed in Normandy, and the liberation of German-occupied France was underway. Throughout June and July, Allied soldiers expanded their beachhead against stift resistance while building up strength for the breakout.
On 25 July, American forces under the command of LTG Omar Bradley ruptured the German deienses on the wescern end of the beachhead and broke into the clear.
The U.S. Third Army, under the command of LT(G George S. Patton, Jr., became operational on I August and poured through the gap.
Thus began one of the most sensational campaigns in the annals of American military history.
Patton's Third Army raced through a narrow corridor between the German Seventh Army and the sea, turned the flank of the entire German line in Normandy, and tore into the German rear. Third Army advanced in all four directions at once, with elements advancing south to the Loire River, west ito the Brittany peninsula, north t) a junction with the Brici:h near Falaise, and east towards the Seine River and Paris. (See Map 1.)
The German forces in Normandy collapsed and, barely escaping total encirclement, streamed back toward Germany with cripplirg losses in men and equipment.
Patton's army pursued ruthlessly and recklessly deep into France. Armored spearheads led the way, with infantry riding the backs of the tanks.
Overhead, fighter-bombers patrolled the flanks, reported on conditions toward the front, and attacked any German unit that took to the roads in daylight.
Allied forces invaded southern France on 15 August and joined in the pursuit.
With the remnants of two German army groups in full retreat, the Supreme Allied Commander, CEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, noted in his diary on 5 September, "The defeat of the German Army is complete."
As Third Army neared the French border province of Lorraine, Third Army's intelligence sources seemed to confirm that the war was virtually over.
The top-secret interceptions known as Ultra revealed that the Franco-German border was virtually undefended and would remain so until mid-September. A corps reconnaissance squadron reported that the Moselle River, the last major water barrier in France, was also undefended. Patton issued orders to his corps to seize Metz and Nancy, sweep through Lorraine, and cross the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end.
But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign.
Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.
Why did the rosy predictions of August go unfulfiLled?
And how did it come to pass that Lorraine would be the scene of Third Army's bloodiest campaign?
The province of Lorraine is the most direct route between France and Germany.
Bounded on the west by the Not only did Lorraine hold out few enticements, but it would prove to be a difficult battlefield as well. The rolling farmland was broken by tangled woods and numerous towns and villages, some of which were fortified. Because the ground rises gently from west to east, the Americans would frequently find themselves attacking uphill. 
Map 3. Route of the Red Ball Express
At ts peAk , Red BalI employed 6,000 trucks that ran day jnJ night in an operation that became iiiore difficult with every mile the armies advanced.
To meet the demands of Logistics, three newly arrived infantry divisions were compleLtly stripped of tneir trucks and left immobiLe in Normandy.
The use of the Red BaLl Express represented a calculated gamble that the war would end before the truckbroke down, for the vehicles were grossly overloaded and preventive maintenance was all buL i'ioLed.
Th tL'J Ball Express itself consumed 300,000 ga Llons of precious gasoline every day--nearLy as much as a field army.
(See Map 3.)
Thus,
it was not surprising that Lon 28 August, with Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's gasoline alLocation fell 100,000 ga Ltons short of requirements; and since all reser,,es had been burned up in the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance beg4an to suf fer aLmiost at once. A field artillery brigade headquarters frequently served as a second FDC, splitting the corps zone with the corps artillery FDC.
The corps FDC system was highly efficient at massing artillery fires and proved to be extremely responsive and flexible.
On one occasion during the Lorraine campaign, an infantry unit about to make an assault contacted XX Corps FDC with a request for artillery support.
The FDC plotted the target and issued orders to the appropriate artillery battalion.
The battalion in turn assigned the mission to a battery which delivered 67 rounds on the target.
The total elapsed time from receipt of request to completion of the mission was 6 minutes.
At the other extreme, XII Corps artillery, aided by the 33d Field ArtiLlAry Brigade, organized a program of fires in support of the November offensive that involved 380 concentrations over a -4-hour period. According to doctrine, the armored division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to be committed after the infantry division had created a penetration.
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The M-4 Sherman tank reflected this doctrine.
It was mobile, reliable, and mounted a general purpose 75-mm gun in most of its variants.
In keeping with doctrine, tank destroyers and not tanks carried the high-velocity antitank guns.
(See Figure 7 .)
The relationship among field army, corps, and division was prescribed by LTG Lesley J. McNair, head of Army Ground Forces in Washington.
Divisions were to be lean and simple, offensive in orientation, with attachments made as necessary.
The corps was designed to be a purely tactical headquarters that could handle any mix of infantry and armored divisions.
The field army allocated divisions to the corps and assigned supplemental combat support and service support elements where needed. The typical division slice in the European theater was 40,000 troops, of which 15,000 were organic to the division, 15,000 were corps and army troops, and 10,000 were Communications Zone personnel.
Logist ics flowed from Communications Zone through the
Rounding out the weapons in Patton's arsenal for the Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the pursuit across France.
Fighter-bombers from the XiX TAC flew L2,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TAC's efforts would be divided between the Lorraine front and the batLles being waged to reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the French coast.
As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be increasingly frustrated by poor weather.
By this stage in the war, however, the German air force was capable only of sporadic operations.
Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets.
In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944.
On 10 September, i2Ln Army Group ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. Patton's forces were already on the move.
The focus of attention in September was on XII Corps, commanded by MG Manton S. Eddy.
The XII Corps was the southern of Third Army's two permanent corps. Its principal components were the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Armored Division.
Later in the month, the 6th Armored Division would join the corps. Eddy's immediate objective was Nancy, one of two major cities in Lorraine. Although unfortified, Nancy was protected by the terrain and, most important, by the Moselle River.
(See Map 5.)
The XII Corps' first attempt to capture Nancy began on 5 September, the day that Third Army received just enough gasoline to resume its advance. Eddy ordered 35th Division to attack Nancy from the west.
Simultaneously, the 4th Armored Division, passing through a bridgehead across the MoseLle (to be secured by 80th Division), would attack the city from the east.
The plan was foiled when 
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In The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew only 3,500 in November.
There was no air activity at all for t2 days out of the month. Corps' artillery plus 5 battalions borrowed from XX Corps--for a total of 42 battalions and 540 guns--poured 22,000 rounds on the stunned Germans.
At 0600, XII Corps jumped off witn three infantry divisions abreast and two armored divisions in corps reserve.
Instead of waiting for a decisive opportunity in which to commit his reserve, Eddy broke the armored divisions up into combat commands and sent them into the line on D plus 2, thus relegating Third Army's most powerful concentration of armor to an infantry-support role.
With the American armor dispersed, the defending German 11th Panzer Division was able to restrict XII Corps' rate of advance with a relatively thin delaying screen and local counterattacks.
(See Map 1L.) General Walker's XX Corps made its main attack across the Moselle in the Metz sector on 9 November, one day after XII Corps.
It, too, achieved surprise. Division and 10th Armored Division had shifted to assembly areas north of Thionville in great secrecy. A detachment of special troops maintained radio traffic and manned dummy guns in the vacated zone.
There was no artillery preparation so as not to disclose the imminent attack. The Moselle flooded out of its banks, which complicated the crossing operation but had the side benefit of inundating the German minefields on the east bank and lulling the defenders into a false sense of security. Finally, 95th Division staged a demonstration south of Thionville that involved crossing a battalion to the east bank, thus drawing attention away from the main effort farther north.
General Balck, commander of German Army Group G, had ordered his units to hold the front with a minimum of strength until the anticipated artillery barrage had passed, whereupon they were to rush forward in force to meet the American assault waves.
Since there was no artillery barrage, and since the Germans otherwise failed to predict the attack, Balck's defensive scheme was unhinged at the outset of the operation.
(See Map 12.)
The 90th Division crossed the swirling waters of the Moselle at Koenigsmacker early on 9 November and established a secure bridgehead. The 10th Armored Division moved up to the west bank, ready to cross into the bridgehead as soon as the engineers were able to build a bridge.
Due to the high, fast waters, 5 days would pass before armor crossed the Moselle in force.
The Moselle crossings taxed Third Army's engineers to the utmost. An infantry support bridge put in behind 90th Division was swept away, and the approaches were flooded.
When the waters finally subsided, bridges were established for the 90th and 95th Divisions, only to be inundated by a 27 second flood even greater than the first. Fle XX Corps left some eLements at ietz to reduce the holdout forts and regrouped the remainder of its forces to join Xli Corps in Third Army's eastward advance. The next obstacle confronting Patton 's troops was the Westwalb, known to the AlLies as the Siegfried Line, that lay just within Germany proper.
The 10th Arnored Division had finally crossed the MoseLLe on 14 November with orders to exploit east and north to the Saar River.
The American tanks nade some progress to the east against the determined resistance of the 21st Panzer Division, but the push to the north came to a haLt along an east-west extension of the 4estwaLL. There would be no clean breakthrough in XX Corps' sector, just as there had been none for XII Corps.
(See MIap 13.) 
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rhe German defenders were critical of, but grateful for, Patron's decision to advance on a broad front of nine divisons spread out over 60 miles.
In particular, they felt that the Amner icans made a grave error in not concentrtatinJ their three armored divisions into one corps for a knockout blow.
The 3 panzer divisions in Lorraine were down to 13, 7, and 4 tanks respectively, a fact that Patton was wellI aware of, thanks to ULtra. On paper, there were 12 German divisions facing Third Army's 9, but in reality, the defenders possessed just I battalion for each 4 miles of front.
Therefore, Patton's decision to tie his Jrmored divisions to the infantry enabled the 6ermnans to delay the Third Army with a thin screen and pull the bulk of their forces back into the WestwaLl.
Facilitating the German delaying action were the fortifications of the Maginot Line, numerous streams, and of course, the weather.
Noncombat casualties, most due to trench foot, roughly equaled comba t casualties for the month of November.
Moreover, 95 percent of the trench foot cases would be out of action, at least until spring. and enemy action took their greatest toll among the infantry, which sustained 89 percent of Third Army's casualties. By the end of November, Patton could no longer obtain enough infantry fillers to replace the losses among his rifle units.
Manpower planners in the Pentagon had failed to foresee that the battle along the German frontier would be a hard-fought affair conducted in terrible weather and had thus failed to allocate enough manpower to infantry training. Back in the States, tank destroyer and antiaircraft battalions were broken up and sent to infantry training centers. In Lorraine, General ?atton "drafted" 5 percent of army and corps troops for retraining as infantry, and when bloody fighting along the West,.all sent infantry losses soaring, he "drafted" an additionaL 5 percent.
In early December, Third Army's Leading elements had pushed across the German border at several places along its front as the Germans withdrew into the Westwall. This campaign also demonstrated some of the drawbacks ;a sociated with the concept of a relatively Light division reinforced by corps attachments.
The triangular division embodied the characteristics of mobility and maneuver, but in Lorraine it was repeatedly employed in direct assaults against an emplaced enemy. In <liiton, American tank crews repeatedly paid a neavv pr ice for a doctrinal dec is ion made before the war th,at declared tanks to be offensive weapons not intended I def.2ns ive combat aginst other tanks. As a result of tis ,)CCicial policy, the M-4 Slhcrman tanks in Lorraine we-e bal.t! outgunned by German panzers that mounted superb an ti tank oi feces.
The tank-stopping task was o ffcially
.,~-':",L ( ) t the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be thinly ir mred, highly motiLe, heavily armed antitank socciaists.
Doctrine calIed for the majority of tank destroyers to be pooled in special corps and army antitank -eserves, wh ich couLd rush to the scene of an armored aittack anywhere along the front.
But Third Army didn't need an antitank reserve in Lorraine because German tanks usually appeared a few at a time.
Consequently, the tank :es:royer concept was discarded after the war, when the L.S. Army decided that the best weapon to stop a tank was another adequately armed tank. 
